Abstract
Introduction
In 1996, the concept of proxy signature was first introduced by Mambo et al [13] . It allows an original signer to delegate his signing power to proxy signer in a proxy signature. Then, the proxy signer can generate signatures on behalf of the original signer, referred to as proxy signatures [22, 23] . To adapt difierent situations, many proxy signature variants are produced, such as threshold proxy signature [6, 9, 14, 17] , proxy multi-signature [5, 8, [10] [11] [12] 18] , and proxy blind signature [15] .
Privacy has become one of the most important human rights of the modern age. Some time, the original signer does not want to reveal the identity of his proxy signer unless something is wrong with the designated business. Although ring and group signature have been proposed, they could not solve the problem appropriately.
A ring signature is a type of digital signature that can be performed by any member of a group of users that each have keys. Therefore, a message signed with a ring signature is endorsed by someone in a particular group of people. One of the security properties of a ring signature is that it should be difficult to determine which of the group members' keys was used to produce the signature.It can reach the target of anonymous, but it is difficult to proof who is the real signer [7, 20] .
A Group signature scheme is a method for allowing a member of a group to anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group. It can reach the target of anonymous and accountable, but it needs a group members not only one (proxy signer) [1, 2] .
In 2006, Han et al has proposed a scheme to solve the anonymous but accountable problem of a proxy signer [21] . But in the scheme, they use a trust third party to reveal the real proxy signer.
In this paper, we provide a simple secure anonymous but accountable method for proxy signer to solve the problem without a pseudonym generator. When the original signer needs, he can provide the evidence to reveal/prove who is the real proxy signer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries employed later in this paper. Section 3 proposes the scheme of the special proxy signature. We analysis the security of the proposed scheme in section 4 and finally conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Because bilinear maps play a key role in our scheme, we will describe basic properties of the bilinear maps, and then also list some related mathematical hard problems.
Bilinear pairings
Let 1 G be a cyclic additive group and 2 G be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same large prime order q . We also assume that the discrete logarithm problems ( ) DLP in both 1 G and 2 G are hard to solve.
A map 
Related mathematical hard problems
Here, we list some related mathematical hard problems in 1 G that we have used later: 1. Discrete Logarithm Problem ( ) DLP : Given two group elements P and Q , to find an integer a , such that Q aP = whenever such an integer exists.
2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (
When the DDHP is easy but the CDHP is hard on the group 1 G , we call 1 G a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. Such groups can be found on super singular elliptic curves or hyper elliptic curves over finite field, and the bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairing.
Our proposed scheme
In an anonymous but accountable proxy signature scheme, the original signer uses its standard signature algorithm to sign a warrant which includes the type of the information delegated, the original signer's identity, proxy signer' s pseudonym (which is correlated to proxy signer's real identity/public key) and the period of delegation, etc. As a result of the interaction between the original and proxy signer, the proxy signer generates a proxy private key. After that, the proxy signer can sign any messages according to the warrant. When necessary, the original signer can reveal the real identity/public key of the proxy signer.
Definition
In an anonymous but accountable proxy signature scheme, there is an original signer O and a proxy signer P . 
Ÿ
Setup is used to produce private/public key pairs as usual. The public and private key pairs for the original and the proxy signers are
Sign is a probabilistic polynomial-time signature issuing algorithm, which takes input message m, signer's private key sk , outputs a signature δ on message m.
Veri is a deterministic verification algorithm. On input signer's public key, message m and a candidate signature δ for m, the algorithm outputs 1 if δ is a valid signature on m for the entity, and outputs 0 otherwise. Ÿ PSGen is a protocol used between the proxy signer and the original signer. The original signer and proxy signer take as input their private keys O sk and P sk . As a result of the interaction, the proxy signer outputs a proxy signing key pro sk which the proxy signer uses to produce an anonymous but accountable proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. Reveal is used to reveal the real identity/public key of proxy signer when necessary.
Demonstration is used to demonstrate the real identity/public key of proxy signer when necessary.
Security model
Adversaries can be classified into seven types:
Type I This type of adversary only has the public keys of the original signer and proxy signer. He aims to forge a signature of a warrant w of the original signer or forge an proxy signature of a message m with respect to the original signer and the proxy signer.
Type II This type of adversary has not only the public keys of the original signer and proxy signer but also the private key of proxy signer. He aims to forge a delegation signature of a warrant w that he chooses of the original signer. Note that once he can get the signature of a warrant w , he can forge any proxy signature on any message.
Type III This type of adversary has not only the public keys of the original signer and proxy signer but also the private key of the original signer. He aims to forge a valid proxy signature.
From above we can find that if an AAPS scheme is unforgeable against Type II and Type III adversary, it is also unforgeable against Type I adversary.
Type IV This type of adversary has only the public key of the original signer. He aims to get the true identity of the proxy signature from the delegation file or the proxy signature.
Type V This type of adversary aims to convince others that the proxy signer has made a proxy signature on behalf of the original signer who have not delegated to the proxy signer.
Type VI This type of adversary only has the public key of the original signer. He aims to malign a irrespective entity as the corresponding proxy signer.
Type VII This type of adversary not only has the public key of the original signer but also the private key of original signer. He aims to malign a irrespective entity as the corresponding proxy signer.
From above we can find that if an AAPS scheme is unforgeable against Type VII adversary, it is also unforgeable against Type VI adversary.
Definition 2.
We define the AAPS scheme's anonymous but accountable property as follows.
Let o be the original signer, p be the proxy signer and v be the verifier. Setup PKG runs the algorithm to obtain the secret key and public key pairs ( , ),( , )
x Y representing the keys of the proxy signer and original signer, respectively. Pre-delegation Proxy signer sends the variation of random number with corresponding signature to the original signer.
Delegation signature generation The original signer computes delegation key and chooses the warrant w . Then he sends them to proxy signer with the corresponding signatures d .
Anonymous but accountable signature generation p chooses a message m, and outputs an anonymous but accountable signature d on m.
Verification Finally, v uses the original signer's public key and proxy signer's pseudonym to check the anonymous but accountable signature.
Reveal if the original signer needed, he can provide the corresponding evidence to reveal who is the real proxy signer.
A proxy signature scheme is said to have the property of anonymous but accountable if no one can found the real proxy signer before the original signer provide evidence to reveal who is the real proxy signer.
Our scheme
In this section, we construct an anonymous but accountable signature scheme based on short signature [4] and Qin Wang and Zhenfu Cao's scheme [16] , which is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in gap Diffie-Hellman groups.
Setup: Use a GDH parameter generator to provide a GDH group G with a prime order q . P is a generator of G . Define two cryptographic hash functions 
Q Q scope etc . At last, the original signer sends
, w and the corresponding signature to the proxy signer. We use more than one pseudonym to avoid the exposure of the relationship between the proxy signer and the corresponding pseudonym.
After verifying the received message, the proxy signer can select and compute a proxy key from the above message 
Analysis of our scheme

Correctness
The correctness of the signature scheme can be satisfied since:
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Security proof
Theorem 1: The above proxy signature is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks and adaptively chosen-warrant attacks in the random oracle model if the Computational DiffieHellman Problem in GDH groups is hard to solve.
Proof. Our scheme is based on short signature [4] and Qin Wang and Zhenfu Cao's scheme [16] , which is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in gap Diffie-Hellman groups. We just omit it.
Theorem 2. Our scheme can stand against Type IV adversary.
From the scheme above, we can find that our scheme reaches the target of anonymous but accountable.
Proof. We suppose that the adversary would get the identity of the proxy signer from the proxy signature. Then he must has got pseui P Oi
. But, it is impossible, because the adversary can not get Oi R from the original signer.
Theorem 3. Our scheme can stand against Type V adversary.
Proof. We suppose that the adversary want to convince others that the proxy signer has made a proxy signature on behalf of a original signer Q¢ who have not delegated to the proxy signer. Because the scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in gap Diffie-Hellman groups, the adversary has to forge
. But it is impossible, because the adversary can not forge the corresponding warrant i w , which has been proved in [16] . . In order to demonstrate Q¢ were the proxy signer, the adversary has to . But it is impossible except he has solved the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a secure anonymous but accountable proxy signature scheme. In the scheme, unless the corresponding evidence has been provided by the original signer, no one can found the proxy signer's real identify/public key. Our proposed scheme has the property of anonymous but accountable without TTP. However, how to find an appropriate method to keep original signer's private key secret while demonstrating whom the real proxy signer is may be a future work.
